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Introduction
Th ere seems to be an unwritten agreement among most Americans that there are 
three topics (perhaps four, if you include sex) that are best avoided in polite com-
pany: politics, personal fi nances, and religion. Th e American reluctance to discuss 
religion with acquaintances at a dinner party or picnic may be a part of a larger 
phenomenon: a manifestation of the secularism that emerged from the disastrous 
European religious wars and the Enlightenment, and that is arguably, as a con-
sequence of those experiences, enshrined in the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.
It is worth noting in this connection that some observers have taken pains 
to distinguish secularism from secularization. Secularism, as it has generally come 
to be understood, is the ascendency of political control over the public activities 
of religious institutions (which has in many quarters had the eff ect of rendering 
religion a matter of individual choice rather than social conscription). Secularism 
means that no religion is to be privileged over any other in the sphere of political life, 
including education. Although there are notable exceptions, in the United States, 
secularism generally means that religious organizations must compete on all fours 
with publics of other sorts. But secularism is by no means identical with an assault 
on religion. On the contrary. By legislating the place of religion in society, secular-
ism in fact provides a safe harbor for religious diversity.
Secularization, on the other hand, is now generally understood as a condi-
tion in which religious considerations cease to function as central factors in the 
lives of individuals, even though those individuals may still represent themselves 
as religious, and may even continue their affi  liation with religious institutions. As 
we shall see, secularization, like secularism, is matter of degree. 
Th ese terms, as they are now employed among sociologists, political scien-
tists, and philosophers, depart somewhat from what one fi nds in the Oxford Eng-
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lish Dictionary. Th e fi rst defi nition of secularism in the OED, for example, is “the 
doctrine that morality should be based solely on regard to the well-being of man-
kind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in 
God or in a future state.”  Th e OED’s second defi nition of secularization, which is 
perhaps more relevant to this essay than its fi rst one, is “the giving of a secular or 
non-sacred character or direction to (art, studies, etc.); the placing (of morals) on a 
secular basis; the restricting (of education) to secular subjects.”
Beyond the provinces of polite company, of course, within political circles 
in the United States and the European Union, and especially at political conven-
tions and on talk radio in the United States, both secularism and secularization 
have become topics of heated discussion. In the United States, attacks on secu-
larism have in large measure come from the Christian fundamentalist or evan-
gelical wing of the Republican Party. Although Christian fundamentalists or 
evangelicals were a key constituent of the coalition that succeeded in capturing 
the executive branch of the government in the elections of 2000 and 2004, sig-
nifi cantly extending their reach into the legislative and judicial branches as well, 
their infl uence now (as I write, in the fall of 2008, aft er the election of President 
Barak Obama) appears to have reached its high water mark. In Europe, secular-
ism appears to be under attack not from indigenous sources, but from religiously 
dogmatic immigrants who wish to roll back the hard-won commitment to sepa-
ration of church and state that characterizes the political situation in most of the 
countries of Western Europe. 
Increased attention to the issues associated with secularism may also be due 
to the increasing pull of globalizing tendencies that are in turn the eff ect of rapidly 
developing techniques of communication across national and cultural borders that 
until recently have remained relatively impermeable. As we come to know more 
about our neighbors around the world, it is probable that we will begin to see attrac-
tive alternatives to traditional ways of organizing ourselves, including alternatives 
to religious organizations as traditionally conceived.
With respect to both the theoretical issues associated with theology and 
the philosophy of religion, and the practical ones associated with quotidian reli-
gious beliefs and practices, however, secularization may well present a much more 
complex set of issues than does secularism. In the case of secularism, it is at least 
in principle possible to assess the extent to which the wall of separation between 
church and state is honored in the United States, or the extent to which anticlerical-
ism continues to function in France or Mexico, or the extent to which the secular 
military in Turkey is capable of preventing national institutions from falling into 
the hands of radical Islamists. In these cases, it is usually (but not always) possible 
to assess the extent to which the activities of religious institutions seek to complete 
with those that are political, and then to apply appropriate legislative and judicial 
actions that will insure the continued separation of the two spheres. As far as I 
know, however, in none of these countries do we fi nd political intrusion into the 
sphere of secularization, since that would be to contradict the central premise of 
Secularism, Secularization, and John Dewey  ? 23
Volume 25 (2) ? 2009
secularism, that is, that (absent illegal activity) religious belief, or the lack of it, is 
a matter of personal conscience and choice.
Assessments of secularization are much more diffi  cult. One of the princi-
pal reasons for this may be the fact that two of the key concepts of secularization, 
religion and religious as they relate to personal belief, are notoriously diffi  cult to 
defi ne. If secularism involves the more or less well defi ned domain of institutions, 
secularization enters into the vague precincts of conscience. Charles Taylor, for 
example, writes that if religion is identifi ed with “the great historic faiths, or even 
with explicit belief in supernatural beings, then it seems to have declined. But if you 
include a wide range of spiritual and semi-spiritual beliefs; or if you cast your net 
even wider and think of someone’s religion as the shape of their ultimate concern, 
then indeed, one can make a case that religion is as present as ever.”1
Quite so. But that is to cast the net widely indeed, and it is likely to capture 
beliefs and practices that many practitioners of “the great historic faiths” will be re-
luctant to recognize as legitimate cases of religious belief and practice. So the ques-
tion remains: just how are we to cast the net so that we get religious beliefs and just 
those beliefs so that we can know what to make of processes of secularization? As 
we know, John Dewey was interested in these matters, and he addressed them in 
both his technical philosophy and his popular writings. Since the year 2009 marks 
the 150th anniversary of his birth, it seems especially appropriate to review his treat-
ments of these important issues at this time. Before turning to Dewey’s insights, 
however, it might be helpful to look at some recent data. 
The Pew Survey
In January 2008, the Pew Research Center published a major study entitled “Religion 
in America: Non-Dogmatic, Diverse and Politically Relevant.” More than 35,000 
Americans were interviewed for the survey.
Viewed in the context of the frequent, vigorous, and sometimes sensa-
tional reportage of what some journalists are fond of calling the “culture wars,” 
the Pew study presents some surprising results. First, Americans are apparently 
much less dogmatic about religion than a regular cable news viewer or talk radio 
listener might have expected. Asked whether many religions can lead to eternal 
life, a sizeable majority (in the 72% to 89% range) of Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, 
Catholics, Orthodox, and mainstream Protestants answered in the affi  rmative. 
A comfortable majority (in the 56% to 59% range) of Protestant Evangelicals, 
Muslims, and members of historically black Protestant churches agreed. Only 
Mormons (at 39% affi  rmative) and Jehovah’s Witnesses (at 16% affi  rmative) were 
in the minority.
Given the question “whether there is more than one true way to interpret the 
teachings of my religion,” the results were also surprising. Mainline Protestants, 
Catholics, Jews, Buddhists, and Hindus answered in the affi  rmative in the 77% to 
90% range. Protestant Evangelicals, Muslims, Orthodox, and members of histori-
cally black Protestant churches agreed in the 53% to 68% range. Mormons and Je-
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hovah’s Witnesses were once again in the minority, answering in the affi  rmative 
by only 43% and 18%, respectively. 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret these fi ndings as an indication 
that Americans do not take their religious views seriously, or that their commit-
ments to various forms of supernaturalism are on the wane. More than half of 
Americans reported that religion is very important in their lives, and some 60% 
believe in a personal God. Remarkably, two-thirds of U.S. adults (68%) believe that 
angels and demons are active in the world. Moreover, according to the report, “a 
plurality of adults who are affi  liated with a religion want their religion to preserve 
its traditional beliefs and practices rather than either adjust to new circumstances 
or adopt modern beliefs and practices.”
I should mention that some evangelicals found these results so surprising 
that they were convinced that the survey instrument must have been fl awed. In 
August of 2008 Pew once again asked the question whether belief in religions other 
than one’s own could lead to eternal life. According to the New York Times, sixty-
fi ve percent of the respondents responded positively. “But this time, to clear up any 
confusion, Pew asked them to specify which religions. Th e respondents essentially 
said all of them [including atheists].2
What Would Dewey Have Made of the Pew Survey?
Based on Dewey’s published work and his correspondence, we can get a fairly good 
idea of what he would have had to say about secularism, secularization, and the Pew 
report. I will discuss this matter under four heads: 1) dogmatism or diversity, 2) su-
pernaturalism, 3) the claim advanced in some quarters that Dewey sought to under-
mine religion, and 4) what I will term “remnant” or “benign” supernaturalism.
Dogmatism or Diversity  
In one important respect, the fi ndings of the Pew report are consistent with one 
of the central claims of John Dewey’s lectures on religion, published in 1934 as 
A Common Faith. Th ere seems to be a strong sense among the majority of reli-
giously affi  liated Americans that religious expression involves choice not only of 
affi  liation, but also of interpretation of scripture and doctrine within a particular 
affi  liation. For his part, of course, Dewey pointed out that there is no such thing 
as religion in the singular: religious expressions are numerous and diverse. Some 
sort of choice, therefore, seems imperative. Simply to remain within the fold of the 
religious beliefs and practices into which one has been born and nurtured is itself 
to eff ect a choice.
But once that point has been reached, once the element of choice has been 
admitted, Dewey suggests, there is no going back. It indicates, as he puts it, “that 
further choice is imminent in which certain values and functions in experience may 
be selected.”3 Dewey then proposes that what is religious, in the sense of “attitudes 
that may be taken toward every object and every proposed end or ideal,” be emanci-
pated from a religion, in the sense of “a special body of beliefs and practices having 
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some kind of institutional organization, loose or tight.”4 Th e fact that the majority 
of religiously affi  liated Americans think there should be a choice of religious belief, 
then, is a step in the right direction. But if that is admitted, then why not take the 
next step? Why not emancipate religious attitudes from institutional religion? 
So Dewey would doubtless have applauded indications that religiously affi  li-
ated Americans tend to be nondogmatic, which is to say, tolerant of the beliefs of 
others both inside and outside their particular communities. Beyond that, how-
ever, it is probably safe to say that he would have viewed the remaining results of 
the Pew survey with some concern. What of Americans’ reported commitment to 
various forms of non-naturalism? Unless we assume duplicity or self deception on 
the part of the respondents, there appears to be scant evidence of secularization in 
the results of this survey.
Supernaturalism 
How did Dewey deal with the issue of supernaturalism, which seems to hover over 
the results of the Pew survey? I have already cited the fi nding that 60% of American 
adults believe in God as a person with whom people can have a personal relation-
ship. When we add those who believe in God as a universal spirit or some other 
manifestation, that number reaches 92%. Remarkably, net belief in some sort of de-
ity reaches 21% among self-described atheists, 55% among agnostics, 66% among 
secular unaffi  liated, and 94% among religious unaffi  liated. Th e survey fi nds that 
70% of Americans say “they are absolutely certain of God’s existence.” 
Although quite complex and widely misunderstood, Dewey’s treatment of 
supernaturalism rewards examination under three subheads: his personal beliefs, 
his technical philosophy, and his role as public intellectual.
Personal Beliefs 
With respect to his personal beliefs, Dewey wrote to Max Otto that “I feel the gods 
are pretty dead, tho I suppose I ought to know that || however, to be somewhat 
more philosophical in the matter, if atheism means simply not being a theist, then 
of course Im an atheist. But the popular if not the etymological signifi cance of the 
word is much wider. It has come to signify it seems to me a denial of all ideal values 
as having the right to control material ones. And in that sense Im not an atheists 
and dont want to be labelled one.”5
So Dewey tells his friend that although he cannot accept the existence of super-
natural forces or entities, he cannot deny the existence of ideals that are transcendent 
in the sense that they extend beyond the horizon of what has so far been realized, 
and at the same time warrant such eff orts as will contribute to their realization in 
concrete terms. Although he described himself as an atheist in one sense of the term, 
it is also clear that Dewey was opposed to militant atheism for the same reason that 
he was opposed to supernaturalism: he thought both positions dogmatic. 
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Technical Philosophy 
With respect to his technical philosophy, Dewey characterized himself as a Natu-
ralist, or, as he once wrote to Corliss Lamont, as a Naturalist of the cultural or 
humanistic variety. His version of Naturalism is spelled out in detail in his essay 
“Anti-naturalism in Extremis,” which he contributed to the 1944 volume Natural-
ism and the Human Spirit.6 A central feature of his Naturalism was a rejection of 
supernaturalism as a legitimate infl uence on, component of, or substitute for philo-
sophical or scientifi c inquiry. Dewey took pains to point out that his rejection of 
supernaturalism did not imply his acceptance of materialism. Th e title of the book 
is signifi cant: the philosophical Naturalism espoused by Dewey and his colleagues 
treats spirituality as a natural part of human life, as involved with eff orts toward 
the reconstruction and realization of ameliorative ideals.
Public Intellectual 
With respect to his role as a public intellectual, Dewey regarded himself as a pro-
ponent of religious Humanism. It was in this connection that he signed the 1933 
“Humanist Manifesto.” Th e seventh point of affi  rmation in that document stated 
that “religion consists of those actions, purposes, and experiences which are hu-
manly signifi cant. Nothing human is alien to the religious. It includes labor, art, 
science, philosophy, love, friendship, recreation—all that is in its degree expressive 
of intelligently satisfying human living. Th e distinction between the sacred and the 
secular can no longer be maintained.” Th e document’s eighth affi  rmation stated 
that “religious Humanism considers the complete realization of human personal-
ity to be the end of man’s life and seeks its development and fulfi llment in the here 
and now. Th is is the explanation of the humanist’s social passion.”7 Dewey says 
that he supported these and the other affi  rmations of the manifesto because of the 
religious context of the time and his sympathy with its agenda.8
Some have claimed that Dewey’s Naturalism, that is, his rejection of supernatu-
ralism, was itself dogmatic.9 So, just bracketing his personal feeling that “the gods 
were dead,” it seems important to examine his philosophical grounds for rejecting su-
pernaturalism. First, it seemed undeniable to him, as it must to any candid observer, 
that the rise of the experimental sciences has had the eff ect of undercutting much of 
traditional supernaturalist theology. Beliefs that are labeled “religious” are not, and 
should not be confused with, eff orts directed toward what he called the scientifi c 
control of facts. Belief in angels and demons, for example (as reported in the Pew 
survey), has all too frequently blocked the way to the type of experimental inquiry 
that allows for control of situations which can be injurious to the lives of individuals 
and communities. In Dewey’s view, when religious beliefs attempt to compete with 
the experimental results of the sciences, they put themselves in peril. 
Second, it also seemed to Dewey that many traditional forms of supernatu-
ralism, especially belief in an aft erlife spent in a heaven or hell (to recur to the Pew 
survey again), are closely connected with an egotistical focus on personal salvation 
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instead of wider concerns with goods that could be more publically shared. In short, 
concern with an aft erlife oft en tends to present a distraction from eff orts expended 
to ameliorate here-and-now social conditions.
Th ird, supernaturalism distorts and defl ects the historical and anthropological 
understanding of religious experience, thus generating a false portrait of the place of 
humanity within a wider nature. Supernaturalism tends to de-naturalize human ex-
perience by opening up an historical chasm between human life and its evolutionary 
origins, as well as an anthropological chasm between human nature as observable, 
on one side, and human nature as an undefi nable mystery, on the other. 
In this regard there is a signifi cant practical diff erence between what we 
might call “top-down” (supernaturalist) and “bottom-up” (naturalist) religious 
expressions. Th is diff erence involves the respective anthropologies of the two po-
sitions. Top-down supernaturalist religious expressions usually involve theoreti-
cal assumptions that are based on a priori claims such as those based on putative 
revelation. Bottom-up naturalist religious expressions, on the other hand, tend to 
build on hard-won scientifi c results in the fi elds of history, evolutionary biology, 
ecology, anthropology, and so on, together with other cultural capital such as mu-
sic and literature.
Even in academic circles it is not diffi  cult to fi nd top-down religious anthro-
pologies. In a recent10 lecture, for example, a prominent philosopher of religion ar-
gued that “to classify a man is to downsize him as a human being, because he could 
not be classifi ed any other way than according to an order and a measure (models 
and parameters) that come to him from elsewhere, which is to say from the workings 
of my rationality.”11 Further, “if God remains incomprehensible, man, who resembles 
nothing other than Him, will also bear the mark and privilege of His incomprehen-
sibility. Put another way: the human being belongs to no kind whatsoever, refers to 
no genus, is not comprehended by any defi nition of (in) humanity. . . . Man is thus 
radically separated from every other being in the world by an insurmountable and 
defi nitive diff erence that is no longer ontological, but holy.”12 And fi nally, “Knowing 
man thus requires referring him to God the incomprehensible and thus by deriva-
tion to grounding incomprehensibility in the incomprehensible.”13
Th ree key points in the preceding paragraph are germane to the theme of 
this essay. First (following Heidegger), techno-scientifi c investigations into the na-
ture of human life are treated as tantamount to regarding humans as objects, that 
is, as “standing reserve.” Such activities are therefore regarded as indefensible. Sec-
ond, human life is described as a mystery that can only be understood in terms of 
(presumably monotheistic) revealed religion. And third, it is apparently asserted 
that human life has no connection to evolutionary history or the rest of nature. In 
short, this well-known philosopher of religion utilizes claims based on top-down 
supernaturalism in an attempt to reinforce Heidegger’s rejection of technology, 
especially medical technology. He claims the same basis for rejecting the fi ndings 
of evolutionary biology and anthropology. His own anthropology, if we may call it 
that, is mystical, or “negative.”14
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John Dewey’s own “bottom-up” naturalist approach to religious attitudes 
and their consequences takes a very diff erent direction. First, he inverts the top-
down process by taking religious attitudes, and not commitments to religious 
doctrine, as his starting point. He frees up inquiry by rejecting, as he puts it, the 
“subordination of candid philosophic thinking to the alleged but factitious needs 
of some special set of convictions.”15 Second, he argues that religious beliefs must 
conform to those that have been arrived at by proven processes of inquiry: “any 
genuinely sound religious experience could and should adapt itself to whatever 
beliefs one found oneself intellectually entitled to hold.”16 Th ird, he reverses one 
of the central claims of traditional religious institutions: “It is the claim of reli-
gions that they eff ect this generic and enduring change in attitude. I should like to 
turn the statement around and say that whenever this change takes place there is 
a defi nitely religious attitude.”17 And fourth, he charges top-down theology with 
vicious intellectualism: “the inherent vice of all intellectual schemes of idealism 
is that they convert the idealism of action into a system of beliefs about anteced-
ent reality.”18 
Perhaps most damning, however, Dewey thinks that the consequences of top-
down forms of religious expressions are unfortunate because they tend to interfere 
with the development of otherwise eff ective moral forces: “For the neglect of sci-
ences that deal specifi cally with facts of the natural and social environment leads 
to a side-tracking of moral forces into an unreal privacy of an unreal self.”19 
In the place of a mystical or negative anthropology, Dewey draws on one that 
is positive. In place of the claim that human nature is incomprehensible, he builds 
an anthropology and social psychology squarely on the doings and suff erings, the 
facilities and constraints, of human behavior.
Did Dewey Seek to Undermine Religion?
Dewey’s intent in writing A Common Faith was not to undermine anyone’s religious 
faith, but instead to provide hope for those who had abandoned, or felt themselves 
abandoned by, institutional religions. In a letter to Max Otto20 he wrote that his 
book “was written for the people who feel inarticulately they have the essence of 
the religious with them and yet are repelled by the religions and are confused.” He 
reiterated this point some ten years later in a letter to U.S. Army private Charles E. 
Witzell. “I have taught many years and I don’t think that any of my students would 
say that I set out to undermine anyone’s faith. . . . Th e lectures making up [A Com-
mon Faith] were meant for those whose religious beliefs had been abandoned, and 
who were given the impression that their abandonment left  them without any re-
ligious beliefs whatever. I wanted to show them that religious values are not a mo-
nopoly of any one class or sect and are still open to them.”21
Contrary to the claims of some of his critics, then, Dewey was not a prosely-
tizer for antireligious sentiment. In terms of our defi nition of secularization, he was 
not an agent of secularization.22 He in fact inverted secularization by attempting 
to reconstruct religious attitudes in ways that would allow them to be central fac-
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tors in the lives of individuals, even though those individuals might have ceased to 
represent themselves as religious, or may have discontinued their affi  liation with 
organized religion.
So although Dewey was a strong proponent of secularism, he was not an agent 
of secularization. He was not antireligious. He thought that institutional religions 
had tended to stifl e what he regarded as freer and more productive religious atti-
tudes, and that such institutions could benefi t from the refreshment and renewal 
that would come from freeing themselves up from reliance on the supernatural. He 
was wary of secularization in the same sense that he was wary of the infl uence of 
religious institutions. He thought that supernaturalism was a drag on the develop-
ment of morals, but unless it was replaced with thoroughgoing humanistic religious 
attitudes, which involved the possibility of “intelligent and objective morals,” then 
the result would be a “half-suppressed skepticism.”23 
Dewey understood anthropology and evolutionary biology well enough to 
realize that people tend to organize themselves into what he called “publics” around 
certain ideals toward which they are willing to work. He also observed that, histori-
cally, commitments to supernatural entities and forces has tended to be a drag on 
ideals that might otherwise be shared among a wide range of various publics.
What then distinguishes religious organizations from other publics, such as 
political parties? Political parties, like religious institutions, tend to have set agen-
das: platforms, ideologies, and so on. But political parties (as a rule) do not tend 
to claim supernatural authority: their ideas must pay their own way in the arena 
where claims are tested in terms of practical results. (And if political parties are to 
be successful, they must also exhibit a certain amount of fl exibility). What Dewey 
wanted for religious institutions was a freer form of association—in which, as pub-
lics among other publics, they could be more fl uid and more productive.
Benign Supernaturalism 
Is there a place for a “benign” supernaturalism? Given the Pragmatic test—that the 
meaning of an idea or system of beliefs lies in the manner in which it functions 
in experience—wouldn’t it be possible for those whose religious beliefs involve su-
pernaturalist commitments to nevertheless take full advantage of the methods of 
inquiry that have proven so successful in the various sciences, and whose further 
application is our best hope for the future? Dewey’s answer is that it would not 
(and this is an important condition), to the extent that even residual supernatural-
ist considerations continue to insinuate themselves into the sphere where critical 
choices infl uence signifi cant outcomes, including those that are technical, social, 
and political.
Th e recent history of political life in the United States bears witness to Dew-
ey’s warning about the eff ects of supernaturalism. For the eight years between 2001 
and 2008, for example, at the level of the federal government, ideology based on 
supernaturalist commitments tended to trump good science in a number of fi elds, 
including climatology, the sciences of human reproduction, and public health 
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policy (to name but a few). Justifi cations for antiscience policies only occasionally 
relied explicitly on supernaturalist grounds. More oft en the refrain was “needs 
more study.” Th is, for example was the justifi cation provided when the director of 
the FDA overruled the agency’s board of science advisors, who had approved the 
“morning aft er pill” by a sizeable majority. 
Realistically, however, it is important to consider an important qualifi cation 
that goes to the heart of the meaning of secularization. Secularization is generally 
understood, as I have indicated, as a condition in which religious considerations 
cease to function as central factors in the lives of individuals, even though those 
individuals may still represent themselves as religious, and may even continue their 
affi  liation with religious institutions. If we take the fi ndings of the Pew reports seri-
ously, then secularization can hardly be said to be rampant in the United States.
But is it not possible that some of the respondents to the Pew survey have 
reported commitment to a supernaturalism that is benign or residual—that is out-
side the central factors in one’s life in terms of ontological commitments but that 
as a functional ideal allows an orientation of oneself to a wider, more harmonious 
whole, to motivating oneself to use all the means at one's disposal, including the 
tools of the sciences and the humanities, in an eff ort to eff ect a general improve-
ment of life? In other words, is it not possible that a reconstructed, more benign 
form of supernaturalism—a supernaturalism that is restricted to a personal, func-
tional outlook on life and that has more or less the same practical consequences 
in the public sphere as those of a religious humanist (that is, a religious individual 
who rejects supernaturalism)? Might not a secularization of this sort be of value 
as a bridge toward more comprehensive, humanistic religious outlooks that unite 
people rather than dividing them?
It may be that one of the reasons why Dewey reports that he never attempted 
to undercut anyone’s religious beliefs is that he understood the transitional poten-
tial of what I am calling benign supernaturalism. As a Pragmatist, Dewey would 
have been a careful observer of what various strands of supernaturalism do, rather 
than what they claim as their ontological foundations. And the fact is that there are 
millions of Americans who claim to adhere to various forms of supernaturalism 
but are quite eff ective in the building of bridges, the operation of public facilities, 
and the conduct of scientifi c research. (Th ere are also supernaturalists on text-
book commissions of some states who do not seem to understand the educational 
importance of the scientifi c discoveries of the last 150 years.) Supernaturalism of 
this sort is benign just in the sense that it has for the most part become encased 
in a protective secular shell: it has become compartmentalized in the lives of its 
proponents in ways that prevent it from competing with the types of inquiry that 
have proven so successful in the sciences. Central, yes. But nevertheless set off  from 
most of quotidian life by an outer shell of practical concerns.
Dewey’s fellow Pragmatist William James had opened the door to this benign 
or secularized supernaturalism some years earlier, in 1890, in Th e Varieties of Re-
ligious Experience. He wrote that “Th e practical needs and experiences of religion 
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seem to me suffi  ciently met by the belief that beyond each man and in a fashion 
continuous with him there exists a larger power which is friendly to him and to his 
ideals. All that the facts require is that the power should be both other and larger 
than our conscious selves. Anything larger will do, if only it be large enough to trust 
for the next step.”24 Applying the spirit of the Pragmatic maxim, James is here fo-
cusing on the practical eff ects of religious belief. He seems to be suggesting that it 
is more or less irrelevant whether it claims supernatural or naturalistic authority. 
In the realm of religious experiences, he seems to say, benign or secularized super-
naturalist motivations can function in more or less the same way as naturalistic 
motivations. Th e real issue is a functional one: not origin, but outcome.
Dewey’s resolution of this issue is diff erent. He viewed the residual or benign 
supernaturalism as at best transitional. Th is is because he thought there is a debili-
tating dualism inherent in such a position: it continues to honor a distorted sense 
of distinction between the sacred and the secular that cordons off  areas of valuation 
from the possibility experimental inquiry. Such a position would at best be a way 
station on the road to a more sustainable position—sustainable because of being 
capable of being reconstructed and renewed.
And that more sustainable position is what he called humanistic Naturalism. 
In inverting secularization as it is generally conceived, Dewey thus proposed that 
non-supernatural religious considerations could continue to function as central 
factors in the lives of individuals (in ways that supernaturalist beliefs could not), 
even though those individuals may have ceased to represent themselves as religious, 
or may have discontinued their affi  liation with religious institutions. Th is would 
be a religious faith that would rise above traditional sectarian squabbles and thus 
become both more available and more attractive across cultural divides. It would 
be highly relevant to contemporary globalizing tendencies.
One of Dewey’s colleagues, John Herman Randall, Jr., reminded us that there 
is plenty of room within Naturalism for religious attitudes, “since [religious belief] 
is an encountered fact of human experience.” Further, religious attitudes need not 
be cold or bloodless: “there is room for celebration, consecration, and clarifi cation 
of human goals; there is room—pace Mr. Dewey!—for man’s concern with the eter-
nal. . . . But for naturalism eternity . . . is a quality of human vision; and divinity 
belongs, not to what is existent, but to what man discerns in imagination.”25  When 
supernaturalist religious arguments enter into the public sphere, they are inherently 
incompatible with the type of inquiry that is essential to the technosciences and 
therefore to honest debates. Naturalist religious arguments, on the other hand, are 
such that they can potentially enter into the fullness of the debates regarding sci-
ence policy as an equal partner and still maintain a place for religious values. Th is 
is because they eschew dogma for experimentation.
On this, the 150th anniversary of the birth of John Dewey, there is every in-
dication that the United States remains a secular society, but one in which secular-
ization has hardly taken root. I believe that Dewey’s treatment of secularism and 
E&C ?  Education and Culture
32  ?  Larry A. Hickman
secularization is as relevant now as it was during his lifetime. Secularism must be 
maintained as a great and hard-won good. But secularization need not, for that 
reason, be embraced. Dewey was convinced that religious belief and practice can 
be reconstructed along lines that are capable of defi ning and promoting what he 
called “a common faith.”
Notes
1. Taylor, A Secular Age, 427.
2. Blow, “Heaven for the Godless?,” A19.
3. LW 9: 8.
4. Ibid. 
5. (1935.01.14) References to John Dewey’s correspondence are to the electronic edi-
tions, Th e Correspondence of John Dewey, 1871-1952. Citations include accession number, 
writer, addressee, and date. 
6. Krikorian, Naturalism and the Human Spirit.
7. See American Humanist Association. About Humanism.
8. (13667) Dewey to Corliss Lamont, September 6, 1940.
9. See, for example, Sheldon, “Critique of Naturalism.”
10. Marion, “Mihi magna quaestio factus sum.”
11. Ibid., 11. 
12. Ibid., 16.
13. Ibid., 17. 
14. Carlson, “Religion and the Time of Creation.” See especially p. 831.
15. MW 5: 153.
16. LW 5: 153.
17. LW 9: 13.
18. LW 9: 17.
19. MW 14: 10.
20. (08049) Dewey to Max Otto, January 14, 1935.
21. (22265) John Dewey to Charles E. Witzell, June 5, 1943.
22. See Rockefeller, John Dewey, for a somewhat diff erent approach to this point.
23. MW 11: 125.
24. James, Th e Varieties of Religious Experience, 413.
25. See Krikorian, Naturalism and the Human Spirit, 358.
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